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Expert judgements of sea-level rise at the local scale 
Whilst local projections of sea-level rise are necessary to facilitate targeted 
climate change adaptation and communication strategies, downscaling from 
global climate models can be problematic. Here, we use expert probability 
judgement to elicit a suite of local projections, and associated uncertainties, for 
future sea-level rise on the Severn Estuary in the southwest of the UK. Eleven 
experts from a range of policy and academic backgrounds took part in a 
structured probability elicitation exercise for the years 2050, 2100 and 2200. In 
addition to the quantitative elicitation, the experts’ reasoning during the task was 
qualitatively analysed. Quantitative analyses show that although there is 
consensus that sea levels will rise on the Estuary in future, there is wide variation 
between judgements and much uncertainty regarding the magnitude of future 
rise. For example, median estimates of sea-level rise (compared to the 2011 level) 
range from 9.6cm to 40cm in the year 2050; 20cm to 100cm in 2100; and 35cm 
to 300cm in 2200. Fifty percent confidence intervals and ninety percent 
confidence intervals vary even more. Qualitative analyses indicate that experts’ 
judgements may have been influenced by their choice of methods and 
information sources, the ways in which they thought about the future, and 
heuristics. The study shows the merits of integrating qualitative and quantitative 
methods to explore the reasoning behind uncertainty judgements. We conclude 
that where expert probability judgements are to be used to characterise 
uncertainty such reasoning should be made explicit. 
Keywords: uncertainty; sea-level rise; expert judgement; probability 
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Introduction 
The provision of information about local sea-level rise (SLR) is a key research 
priority for the climate change planning and adaptation community (MCCIP 2014). 
However, while projections of mean future global SLR are numerous (e.g. IPCC 2007a, 
Nicholls, Marinova, et al. 2011), local projections can be problematic due to spatial 
variability and difficulties with downscaling. This paper therefore reports findings of an 
expert judgement study for local SLR, presenting estimates for the Severn Estuary in 
the southwest of the UK (Figure 1).  
The Severn Estuary is a unique environment. It has the second largest tidal range 
in the world, with an average mean spring tidal range of 12.3m (Langston, Jonas, and 
Millward 2010), and it drains the UK’s longest river. It is of high ecological 
significance (Severn Estuary Coastal Group and ATKINS 2010), and is a designated 
Special Protection Area, Special Area of Conservation and Ramsar site. There is a 
mixture of urban and rural land uses around the Estuary, and its shores are home to 
around one million people (Severn Estuary Partnership 2011). It is also  the location for 
major infrastructures, and may in future become a key source of renewable energy 
(House of Commons 2013, Tidal Lagoon Cardiff 2015). 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
Sea-level measurements from tide gauges, satellites and proxy data show that 
global mean sea level rose during the 20th century and is continuing to do so (IPCC 
2007b, Gehrels et al. 2007, IPCC 2013a). As the world continues to warm with climate 
change, mean global SLR is inevitable (Nicholls, Hanson, et al. 2011) through thermal 
expansion (changes in water volume due to temperature change) and glacio-eustacy 
(changes in water volume due to additions from melting land-ice). Indeed, records show 
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that the mean sea level on the Severn Estuary is gradually rising (Phillips and Crisp 
2010), and has been throughout the current interglacial period (Environment Agency 
2006).  
Future SLR on the Estuary is expected to cause increased flooding and erosion 
risks, leading to various social, economic and physical impacts. The scale of such 
impacts will depend on the rate and magnitude of this SLR, which will be forced by 
both global and local factors acting over short and long timescales. Many of these 
factors are uncertain, and although sea levels are expected to continue to rise in future 
(e.g. Phillips and Crisp 2010, UK Climate Projections 2012), the amount of rise is 
unknown.   
 Despite these uncertainties, policy decisions will still need to be made in order 
to plan adaptation measures; and without assessments of the scale, magnitude and 
likelihood of future events, policy makers will make their own assumptions about the 
probability of different outcomes (Mastrandrea and Schneider 2004). An aim of the 
present study was to address this issue using established elicitation methods to provide 
local probability assessments for SLR, and compare them with projections in the 
literature. We also provide long timescale projections, and explicitly represent the 
uncertainty implicit in experts’ projections, in order that such uncertainty can be 
acknowledged in decision making. Finally, we carry out an exploratory thematic 
analysis of interview transcripts to identify factors that may influence how experts make 
their judgements of SLR.  
We begin by augmenting these aims and considering how expert probability 
judgements can address them. We then present the methodology used to elicit these 
judgements, before discussing the quantitative and qualitative results and their 
implications.   
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Study aims 
The first aim of this study was to provide local probability estimates of SLR on 
the Severn Estuary, which will be of potential interest to researchers, the public, 
adaptation planners and policy makers. The UK Climate Projections1 provide such 
estimates for locations on the Severn Estuary, and other projections are also available 
(e.g. Phillips and Crisp 2010, Severn Estuary Coastal Group and ATKINS 2010). We 
were interested in how experts would utilise these projections and how their own 
projections would compare. As such, our analysis reveals the range of expert estimates 
that may be omitted from aggregate, official estimates.   
Our second aim was to provide long timescale projections. With one notable 
exception (Titus and Narayanan 1996), few authors have considered SLR projections 
further into the future than 2100, beyond which the magnitude of climate change and 
the resulting impacts are likely to be very large (Houghton 2009). This is important 
because management decisions made now have consequences beyond 2100 (Lenton et 
al. 2006). Coastal developments and infrastructures that are built today can be expected 
to endure through the 22nd Century, and some marine renewable energy projects 
proposed for the Estuary, such as a Severn Barrage tidal scheme, would be expected to 
have a lifespan of 120 years or more (DECC 2010, House of Commons 2013). The 
importance of long timescale projections is now being increasingly recognised (Lenton 
et al. 2006, Winkelmann et al. 2012), including in the latest reports by the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 2013a). In order to explore the 
feasibility of eliciting subjective probabilities for such long timescales (a 
methodological question relevant to both SLR and climate change projection more 
                                               
1
 The UKCP09 projections are a suite of climate projections for the UK, providing climate 
information for those planning climate change adaptation (UK Climate Projections 2012). 
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generally) we therefore elicited estimates for 2200 as well as for the more usual time 
horizons of 2050 and 2100, with which climate experts are familiar.  
The third aim was to explicitly represent uncertainty. The literature does not 
always represent the nuances and wide range of opinions held by experts, and local 
climate change impact studies particularly lack comprehensive appraisals of uncertainty 
(Dessai and Hulme 2004). Research shows that experts can hold vastly different views 
about the same topic (Nordhaus 1994, Vaughan and Spouge 2002, Zickfeld et al. 2010, 
Zickfeld et al. 2007, Arnell, Tompkins, and Adger 2005), but such diversity is not 
always represented in consensus reviews such as IPCC reports, where much of the focus 
lies in central tendencies (Kunreuther et al. 2013). The elicitation of probability 
distributions discourages such simplification and allows for questions like ‘what 
physically could not happen?’ or ‘what is the worst that could happen?’ (as per Hulme, 
Pielke, and Dessai 2009, 127).  
Our final aim was to explore how SLR projections may be influenced by 
heuristics (cognitive aids or mental shortcuts). The effects of heuristics on probability 
judgements have been well documented (e.g. Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky 1982), 
and research has explored how cognitive processes affect experts’ judgements about 
other risks (e.g. Donovan, Oppenheimer, and Bravo 2012), but none have addressed 
such themes in relation to quantitative projections of SLR. Thus, the expert interviews 
have also been analysed qualitatively in order to explore the reasoning behind 
judgements. Our mixed-methods approach is a particular strength of the present study 
and acknowledges the value of one-to-one discussion as part of elicitation processes 
(Spetzler and Stael Von Holstein 1975), as well as the need to understand factors that 
may contribute to divergent expert judgements (Sjöberg 1999).  
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Expert probability judgement  
Arnell, Tompkins, and Adger (2005) discuss three ways of estimating the likely 
occurrence of future events: looking at past records, using computer models to simulate 
future conditions, and using expert judgement. They remind us that the first method 
assumes that the events in question have occurred in the past, and that the conditions 
were the same then as they will be in future; and that the second method relies upon the 
underlying assumptions of the models. Indeed, both of these methods to some extent 
require the judgements of experts, either explicitly or implicitly (Fischhoff et al. 1981, 
Pidgeon et al. 1992). The third method uses these expert judgements directly, and is the 
one employed here.  
Probability elicitation techniques aim to ‘draw out’ personal judgements of 
likelihood and systematically quantify perceptions of uncertainty. Such methods have 
been used to provide estimates of uncertain outcomes in many fields, from estimating 
engine sales and crop yields to making clinical diagnoses (O'Hagan et al. 2006). In the 
climate change arena they have been used to estimate the likelihood of rapid climate 
change (Arnell, Tompkins, and Adger 2005), tipping points in the climate system 
(Lenton et al. 2008), and uncertainties in future polar bear populations (O’Neill et al. 
2008), amongst others. While expert judgement is not a substitute for further empirical 
study, it can provide valuable insights for decision makers while research is ongoing. 
Directly eliciting experts’ most up-to-date knowledge and views also avoids consulting 
literature that may not be comprehensive, locally relevant, or fully endorsed by the 
scientific community.  
Elicitation methods vary in their means of engaging experts and in their focus on 
achieving consensus or plurality. One way of engaging experts with the task is to 
conduct individual face-to-face interviews (e.g. Zickfeld et al. 2010). Although 
resource-intensive, this method benefits from the rapport built between interviewer and 
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interviewee, which allows participants to discuss the meaning of questions (Watson and 
Buede 1987), and raise new concepts or concerns. This is especially useful when 
eliciting judgements for complex risks like SLR.  
Another way of engaging experts requires them to convene as a group. The 
Nominal Group Technique (NGT) is one such approach, which facilitates the 
‘structured sharing of ideas’ before a group decision is reached by pooling votes from 
each participant (Delbecq, Ven, and Gustafson 1975, 8). While this method benefits 
from direct discussion and debate, judgements can be biased towards the most reputed 
or respected members of the group. The process also relies on all of the participants 
being available in the same place at the same time, which is often unfeasible.  
The Delphi method circumvents this problem by engaging a group of experts 
remotely, while still facilitating interaction through written exchanges. The method was 
initially developed by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s to obtain consensus opinions 
for military purposes (Dalkey and Helmer 1963), but proved highly popular and has 
since been utilised in fields as varied as healthcare and real estate (Gupta and Clarke 
1996). There are many methodological variations (Linstone and Turoff 2002), but the 
protocol generally involves a number of iterations whereby: i) experts are asked for 
their opinions; ii) these opinions are summarised and shown to the experts again to 
allow for revisions of their earlier answers; iii) the process is repeated, usually leading 
to a convergence towards a ‘consensus’ answer (though see Turoff 2002). 
The RAND Appropriateness Method extends the Delphi method to incorporate 
panel discussions, which, like the NGT, provide participants the opportunity to discuss 
the problem and reflect on other experts’ views. The procedure begins with a literature 
review and a synthesis of the evidence, and is followed by a two-round ‘modified 
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Delphi’ process consisting of an individual survey and a panel group meeting (Fitch et 
al. 2001).  
Once an engagement approach has been chosen, there are a number of ways to 
elicit and encode judgements. To aid the conceptualisation of probabilities, judgements 
can be elicited indirectly, whereby choices are made between bets (Savage 1972). 
However, while this method is more intuitive for participants unfamiliar with the notion 
of probability, it carries the risk that gambling behaviour will affect judgements (see 
Morgan and Henrion 1990 for a discussion). Where experts are familiar with 
probability, they can be asked to directly state numerical probabilities (for example as 
fractions, decimals or percentages). Judgements can be encoded as single point 
estimates, confidence intervals or continuous distributions. 
Once judgements have been elicited, it may be desirable to combine results from 
all or some of the experts to provide one refined judgement (e.g. Titus and Narayanan 
1996, Vaughan and Spouge 2002, Bamber and Aspinall 2013). A single probability 
distribution can be more useful for decision makers than a number of separate ones, and 
it has long been argued that combining judgements can lead to aggregate assessments 
that are ‘better’ than any individual’s (Galton 1907). There are a number of ways of 
combining experts’ opinions. Some are based on Bayes’ theorem and require the 
decision maker to provide a prior probability, while others are based on psychological 
scaling methods that allow more qualitative assessments via pairwise comparisons (see 
Cooke 1991, for a review). Another class of methodologies weights the contributions of 
experts according to factors such as a given preference, the expert’s own self-reported 
expertise, or their demonstrated abilities in quantifying uncertainty. The Classical 
Method (Cooke 1991) is a popular approach, whereby weights are based on the expert’s 
ability to estimate quantities of known ‘seed variables’ from their own field.  
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The choice of methodology for engaging experts and eliciting their judgements 
is dependent upon the aims and constraints of the research. On account of the 
elicitations reported in this study forming part of lengthier one-to-one interviews about 
various aspects of SLR, a face-to-face approach was most appropriate. Due to our 
intention to explore plurality rather than reach consensus, interactions between experts 
was not essential, and we did not combine judgements. Probabilities were elicited 
directly, but a probability wheel2 was on hand as an optional visual aid if participants so 
desired.  
Judgements were encoded as cumulative density functions (CDFs). These 
provide detailed representations of experts’ beliefs in the form of a ‘well-understood 
and convenient distribution’ (O'Hagan et al. 2006, 100), and can be more useful than 
point estimates for decision makers who need to be flexible to multiple outcomes. To 
elicit these distributions, we used a procedure based on the Stanford/SRI protocol 
(Spetzler and Stael Von Holstein 1975). The protocol consists of five phases (see 
‘Probability elicitation methods’, below) designed for the expert to work in ways they 
find most comfortable or familiar and thus reduce ‘mental acrobatics’ (Spetzler and 
Stael Von Holstein 1975, 343). Forty years after the protocol was developed, variants 
continue to be used to elicit probabilities of uncertain quantities (e.g. Bistline 2014), and 
the protocol is cited by the IPCC as ‘good practice’ in eliciting expert judgements 
(IPCC 2006).   
                                               
2
 A probability wheel is a device for visually representing probabilities. The arms of the wheel 
can be moved to represent larger or smaller slices of the wheel, like a pie chart, and a 
spinning pointer is anchored in the centre of the wheel. 
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Methods  
Elicitations formed part of two-hour individual face-to-face interview sessions 
regarding SLR on the Severn Estuary, held during the summer of 2011. The 11 
participating experts held academic, consultancy and governmental roles with expertise 
in sea-level processes, impacts and adaptation responses on the Severn Estuary. This 
number of experts was deemed sufficient for our study as it covered all relevant fields 
and included leading figures in sea-level rise on the Severn Estuary. The sessions were 
facilitated by the lead author, who –besides being trained in qualitative interview 
techniques– had previously studied and modelled SLR, and spent six months 
researching SLR on the Severn Estuary prior to the interviews. This provided sufficient 
expertise to enable full engagement with the participants and the task.   
Sampling  
There is ‘no agreed definition of what constitutes an “expert”’(Lowe and 
Lorenzoni 2007), and expertise can be described using a variety of criteria. An expert 
can be defined by the way in which they approach a problem (O'Hagan et al. 2006), 
how they work with the topic (e.g. through interacting with it or contributing to it) or 
through their lived experience (Collins and Evans 2002). Alternatively, an expert can be 
anyone whose knowledge we want to elicit (Garthwaite, Kadane, and O'Hagan 2005). 
For this study, interviewees were selected on the basis of their professional expertise in 
relation to a broad series of key questions regarding local SLR on the Severn Estuary 
(c.f Rice 2010). These questions related not only to the extent of future SLR, but also to 
its impacts, physical and social vulnerabilities, mitigation measures and adaptations. 
Due to the complexity of SLR processes and impacts on the Estuary, the experts 
covered a wide range of backgrounds and disciplines. This allowed experts without 
specific expertise in SLR processes, but with other relevant expertise, to participate in 
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the research (c.f. Lowe and Lorenzoni 2007). The views of less specialised experts are 
significant, not only because their input can add value to exercises such as this (Tichy 
2004), but because their roles (e.g. government, consultancy) mean their judgements 
may influence risk management decisions and policy recommendations.  
Experts were identified through a literature review and through 
recommendation. A snowball sampling procedure was also used, whereby each 
participating expert was asked to suggest others in the field who might be willing to 
take part. The experts consisted of six academics (specialising in coastal processes, 
hydrological modelling, climate change, coastal engineering, estuarine systems and 
meteorology), two national government officials, one local government official, one 
Environment Agency coastal engineer and one marine environmental consultant (Table 
1).  
[Table 1 here] 
Probability elicitation methods 
Each expert participated in three elicitations: one for 2050, one for 2100 and one 
for 2200. The interview protocol was adapted from the Stanford / SRI Assessment 
Protocol (Spetzler and Stael Von Holstein 1975) and from Watson and Buede (1987). It 
ran as follows: 
(1) Motivation 
Rapport was developed between the interviewer and the participant during a 
semi-structured interview prior to the probability elicitation, and the objectives 
of the elicitation were made clear. Participants were made aware of common 
heuristics and biases in order that such biases might be reduced. These heuristics 
can include: anchoring, where an initial estimate is used as an anchor on which 
to base subsequent estimates, biasing judgements towards the initial anchor 
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(Tversky and Kahneman 1974); overconfidence, which is common both in 
expert and non-expert judgements and can result in probability distributions that 
are too narrow (e.g. Baddeley, Curtis, and Wood 2004); and herding, where 
other peoples’ opinions are incorporated into the participant’s own, leading to 
problems if the ‘herd’ is led down the wrong path (Baddeley, Curtis, and Wood 
2004). 
(2) Structuring 
The conditions of the probability elicitation were specified so that each estimate 
was as ‘accurate’ as possible. The conditions specified in this study were that the 
judgements should be for sea-level change3 in 2050, 2100 and 2200 on the 
Severn Estuary relative to 2011 levels. Two experts responded by providing 
multiple judgements for conditions with divergent parameters under ‘business as 
usual’ and alternative scenarios. No other constraints were set, and experts were 
free to make estimates as large or small as they felt appropriate. This is in 
contrast to subjective probability elicitations of SLR projections carried out by 
Titus and Narayanan (1996), where experts were consulted regarding the 
probabilities of each separate parameter in a SLR model, and the results 
aggregated, thus constraining projections by model parameters. 
(3) Conditioning 
The participant was asked to talk about the information, scenarios and anchors 
they used, and assumptions they made. Participants were free to refer to the 
literature throughout the elicitation. Some elicitation studies encourage experts 
to consult literature and other materials during the elicitation in order to obtain 
                                               
3
 The term ‘sea-level change’ was used throughout the interviews to prevent biasing answers 
towards sea-level rise if participants felt sea-level fall was possible.  
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the expert’s ‘carefully considered opinion’ (Zickfeld et al. 2010, 12456), but it 
could be argued that this practice encourages anchoring. During the first 
interview it became apparent that the experts’ roles and self-perceived 
competencies in carrying out the task meant that some would feel more 
comfortable consulting the literature (as they would if they were considering 
projections in a normal work situation). Whether they referred directly to the 
literature or not, participants were encouraged to talk about which sources they 
drew upon (Table 3). Throughout the elicitation, participants were also asked 
questions such as ‘how might extreme values come about?’ and ‘is there no way 
at all that sea-level change could be more/less than that?’ to increase the 
robustness of estimates.  
(4) Encoding  
Although the probability elicitations were mainly directed in terms of percentage 
probability (e.g. a 95% chance of SLR being greater than X) or as a decimal (e.g. 
a probability of 0.95 that SLR will be greater than X), judgements were not 
constrained in this way and participants were encouraged to think of probability 
in the way they were most comfortable. For example, Expert 7 described small 
probabilities as fractions. A probability wheel was available but most 
participants did not utilise it. The encoding process was as follows: 
 First, the participant was asked to think about what the extreme values might be 
and give the absolute upper and lower bounds (the range) of possible sea-level 
change, however small the probabilities. This reduces the possibility of 
anchoring on a mean or central estimate (Morgan and Henrion 1990) and 
counteracts central bias (the tendency to choose data points around the middle of 
the distribution) (Spetzler and Stael Von Holstein 1975). The maximum and 
Journal of Risk Research  
 
minimum sea level values were marked onto graph paper, and a scale was drawn 
between them to create an x-axis.  
 Next, the participant was asked to assign cumulative probabilities to sea level 
values within that range. Each response was marked onto the graph (marked 
with an ‘X’ on the example in Figure 2), the y-axis of which had been prepared 
prior to the interview. This process was repeated until around eight points were 
spread out on the distribution. Any inconsistencies were checked and corrected 
if necessary.  
 A line (marked ‘A’ in Figure 2) was then drawn between the points to produce a 
CDF.  
 The sea level values corresponding to the median and the 50% and 90% 
confidence intervals were then read from the graph (example marked with a B in 
Figure 2), and the distribution adjusted if necessary until the respondent was 
satisfied that it summarised their own probability assessment.  
 Finally, the participant was asked ‘If I had £1000 and would give it to you if you 
made exactly the right estimate of sea-level change by [year], what would your 
absolute best estimate be?’ In practice, participants usually view their ‘best 
estimate’ as the median (Spetzler and Stael Von Holstein 1975), but this is not 
always the case (Morgan and Henrion 1990).  
(5) Verification 
Throughout the elicitation, estimates were checked to ensure the participant 
actually believed their distribution. For example, if the probability of 50cm or 
more SLR was 0.7, the probability of it being less than 50cm was checked to be 
0.3. 
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[Figure 2 here] 
CDFs were converted into box plots (c.f. Morgan, Pitelka, and Shevliakova 
2001, Morgan and Keith 1995) (Figure 3) so that experts’ judgements could be 
compared and contrasted.  
Thematic analysis 
Although subjective elicitations of SLR have been carried out previously (Titus 
and Narayanan 1996, Bamber and Aspinall 2013), none to our knowledge have been 
thematically analysed to explore factors that may have influenced experts’ judgements. 
Therefore, experts were encouraged to talk through their thoughts as they worked 
through the elicitations, and the process was audio-recorded, transcribed and coded to 
capture the dominant themes emerging from the transcripts (c.f. Moser et al. 2011). A 
grounded approach was used (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Henwood and Pidgeon 1992), 
whereby concepts ‘emerged’ from the interviews, and the codes were developed to fit 
the data. NVivo (a computer-assisted qualitative analysis program) was used to aid the 
coding, sorting and organisation of data.  
Results and discussion 
Quantitative findings 
The box plots in Figure 3 summarise the distributions of expert estimates of 
SLR for 2050, 2100 and 2200. They show the range of judged possible values, the 5th 
and 95th percentiles, the interval spanned by the 50% confidence interval, the median 
and a ‘best estimate’. Wider spreads indicate greater uncertainty.  
[Figure 3 here] 
The box plots show that all participants projected a high likelihood of future sea-
level rise on the Severn Estuary, with three experts asserting very low probabilities 
(≤2%) of sea-level fall for 2100 or 2200. The plots also show that despite strong 
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consensus that there will be SLR on the Severn Estuary, there is wide variation between 
judgements. For example, the upper 95% confidence levels for the year 2050 range 
from 10.7cm to 95cm (i.e. there is an estimated 5% chance that SLR will exceed this 
value); median estimates for 2100 range from 20cm to 100cm; and ‘best estimates’ for 
2200 range from 25cm to 280cm, more than an order of magnitude difference. 
There was also considerable variation regarding how much SLR is thought to be 
possible on the Severn Estuary: while Expert 8 perceived a very remote possibility 
(1/109 chance) of 70m SLR by 2050, Experts 1, 4 and 11 projected an absolute 
maximum of 0.5m. Levels of confidence also vary: for example while some experts 
were willing to state absolute maximum and minimum values (e.g. Expert 10), others 
were not (e.g. Expert 7).  
Consistent with a recent expert judgement study (Bamber and Aspinall 2013), 
the results indicate a wider diversity of opinion than that shown in often cited reports 
such as the IPCC and UKCP09, a selection of which are summarised in Table 2. 
Notably, while median estimates of SLR - which ranged from 9.6cm to 40cm in the year 
2050, 20cm to 100cm in 2100, and 35cm to 300cm in 2200 - were of the same order of 
magnitude as the IPCC’s Fourth and Fifth Assessment Reports (IPCC 2007a, 2013b), 
the experts in this study typically made high estimates that were much greater than these 
ranges. These findings support work by Kriegler et al. (2009), who found that in many 
cases, experts’ probability judgements relating to tipping points in the climate system 
were considerably higher than those in current climate change assessments; as well as 
classic psychological studies showing group decisions can be more conservative than 
individual ones (Zajonc, Wolosin, and Wolosin 1972). They also support recent work 
that shows a majority of experts believe that the 2013 IPCC assessment may be too 
optimistic about SLR (Vision Prize 2014). It should be noted that the Fifth Assessment 
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Report’s likely SLR range of between 0.52 and 0.98m by 2100 is not a worse case upper 
limit (Church et al. 2013), and is for global rather than local SLR so is not directly 
comparable. Furthermore, the Fifth Assessment estimates, which draw upon a variety of 
models and literature sources, are an area of considerable disagreement, particularly in 
terms of their low confidence in semi-empirical models (Rhamstorf 2013, Grinstead 
2013).  
[Table 2 here] 
Qualitative findings 
Our qualitative analyses support previous work (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 
1974) showing that judgements are influenced by a great many factors including the 
methods and sources that participants used, their heuristics, and the ways in which they 
thought about the future.  
Methods, sources and heuristics 
Consistent with Spetzler and Von Holstein’s (1975) observation that people tend 
to place more confidence in a single piece of ‘representative’ information than in a 
larger body of more generalised information, seven of the 11 experts directly or 
indirectly used UKCP09 (see UK Climate Projections 2012) to guide their judgements 
(Table 3). This is to be expected considering that UKCP09, a suite of UK climate 
projections providing information for adaptation planning, itself consists of probabilistic 
distributions from an ensemble of climate models. However, and despite UKCP09 being 
particularly popular, few experts based their projections solely on a single data source. 
Other sources included experts’ own measurements, satellite observations, IPCC 
projections (IPCC 2007a), the Severn Estuary Shoreline Management Plan (Severn 
Estuary Coastal Group and ATKINS 2010) and papers published about local and 
regional SLR (see Table 3).  
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Anchoring was evident throughout the interviews. While efforts were made to 
encourage participants to concentrate on ranges of possible outcomes rather than 
anchoring judgements on particular values, some preferred to calculate their distribution 
directly from values in the published literature (e.g. Expert 9 below). Herding was also a 
theme, with one participant remarking that he had been ‘institutionalised’, and another 
that she had been ‘brainwashed’. The implications are that judgements may be biased 
towards particular sources and particular values (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). This 
would lead to problems if these end up being wrong (Baddeley, Curtis, and Wood 
2004). 
‘I have been institutionalised, if you like. I’ve fed myself a diet of about 40 
centimetres’ – Expert 3, Academic. 
 
‘I’ve been brainwashed, haven’t I? By lots of clever scientists’ – Expert 5, 
Consultant. 
 
We talk very much about one metre by the end of the [Shoreline Management] 
Plans, which is 100 years. So I don’t tend to do anything below that. I tend to talk 
about one metre in 100 years – Expert 9, Government.  
[Table 3 here] 
Experts chose different methods by which to construct their judgements. These 
included: calculating a linear rise from recorded rates of SLR on the Estuary (e.g. 
Expert 6); extrapolating from a range of emissions scenario graphs (e.g. Expert 10); 
thinking about extreme scenarios, feedbacks and time lags (e.g. Expert 2); ‘gut feelings’ 
(e.g. Expert 7); and using indicators from local geomorphology (e.g. Expert 3). It is 
feasible that these methods may have influenced the judgements. For example, Expert 6 
used his own data and had higher confidence in his 2050 projections than any other 
expert, denoted by the narrowest confidence intervals. Expert 2, who thought about 
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extreme scenarios, feedbacks and time lags, had the widest confidence intervals of all 
2200 judgements.  
While the current dataset does not permit statistical comparisons, results indicate 
that experts’ roles or backgrounds may have influenced the methods that they chose. 
Academics (e.g. Experts 1, 3, 6 and 10) tended to use rates from published sources, for 
example to extrapolate to future SLR. Those more involved with policy making (e.g. 
Experts 5 and 7) tended to cite more personal methods such as a general feel or semi-
informed gut feelings, which can also be rational modes of reasoning (Slovic et al. 
2004). These observations are consistent with research showing that scientists’ 
methodological preferences are related to their academic backgrounds and experiences 
(Donovan, Oppenheimer, and Bravo 2012), as well as with wider literature describing 
the ‘context-bound nature’ of expert rationality (Wynne 1989, 36), and earlier work 
recognising that ways of teaching and learning shape the production of scientific 
knowledge (Wittgenstein 1953, Kuhn 1962, Foucault 1977). The findings also lend 
support to the notion that the views of a variety of experts can add value to foresight 
exercises (Tichy 2004) and that expert panels should include participants from a variety 
of relevant disciplines (Fitch et al. 2001).  
Future thinking  
Transcripts indicate that the ways in which experts think about the future may 
have influenced their probability judgements. This emerged as two themes: uncertainty 
and optimism. Uncertainty in empirical quantities such as sea levels arises from many 
sources, including statistical variation, inherent randomness, disagreement, 
approximation, linguistic imprecision and variability (Morgan and Henrion 1990). Table 
4 lists the sources of uncertainty cited by participants. Some are aleatory uncertainties, 
arising from factors such as random variability within a system, and are not reducible by 
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further research. Others are epistemic, arising from things that could be known but are 
not, and can in theory be reduced by further research. These qualitative findings are 
supported by the quantitative data, which show that almost all judgements exhibit wide 
probability ranges and confidence intervals, indicating large uncertainties in projections.  
[Table 4 here] 
Experts tended to find it particularly difficult to think about the future beyond 
2100, as shown in the quotes below. This is to be expected because uncertainties 
increase with time due to the chaotic nature of the climate system and unknowns such as 
emissions scenarios. Lenton et al. (2006, 2) suggest that the tendency to focus on short 
timescales also ‘surely reflects the human lifetime’ and our difficulty in contemplating 
the world ‘long after we cease to live in it’. Indeed, research shows individuals have 
difficulty imagining the future much beyond 15-20 years (Tonn, Hemrick, and Conrad 
2006). Furthermore, most of the sources upon which experts based their judgements do 
not make projections beyond 2100.  
‘What’s the purpose of the outlandish [2200 elicitation]?’ – Expert 3, Academic. 
 
[2100] ‘There’s a problem here though, because it’s going to be so dependent on 
the futures, isn’t it. And so it gets less like simple probability. [It is now] 
conditional probability, which makes me very uncomfortable because it’s just like 
guessing’ … [2200] ‘200 years and 1000 years, you know, it is really difficult to 
actually think that far ahead…’ – Expert 4, Academic.  
 
‘[2200] It’s a stupidly long time’ – Expert 5, Consultant. 
 
‘[2200] It’s all these ifs ifs ifs ifs ifs’ – Expert 6, Academic.  
 
[2100] ‘Gosh we’re really guessing, aren’t we. That’s so far away that so many 
things can happen’ – Expert 7, County Council. 
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‘200 years. I have NO confidence in my estimates AT ALL that far ahead, because 
it’s just TOO far ahead to conceive of, really... It’s so far ahead in the future as to 
be completely meaningless… These are now WILD guesses’ – Expert 9, 
Government.  
 
[2200] ‘For a median change, I feel- well, we’re getting into the realms of science 
fiction here’ – Expert 11, Academic.  
Another way in which future thinking may have influenced judgements was 
optimism. Optimism can be described as a personal disposition; an inclination to believe 
that the world is the ‘best of all possible worlds’, or hopeful expectations in a given 
situation (Gillham et al. 2001, 53). Expert 4 made best estimates that were considerably 
lower than her median estimates. When she realised her inconsistency, she indicated 
that this was because she was optimistic4, stating ‘I just have this feeling that the nearer 
we get to those times, the more likely that people will actually wake up to do something 
about it’. The quotes below further indicate that an optimistic disposition may have 
influenced some participants’ judgements.  
‘[It is the] optimism in me thinking that we’ll have hopefully curbed some 
emissions’ – Expert 3, Academic.  
 
‘I’d like to think it would be nearer 20 than 50[cm]. So we had actually got a grip 
on it... We can do it… Fighting with my optimism and my pessimism.’ – Expert 5, 
Consultant.  
These findings are consistent with a growing body of research regarding the 
relationships between probability estimates, optimism and pessimism (Vosgerau 2010, 
Windschitl et al. 2010, McKenna 1993). Interestingly, those experts who vocalised their 
                                               
4
 Although there may be winners and losers with SLR, evidence strongly indicates that the negative 
implications of SLR will outweigh any potential benefits (IPCC 2014). Thus, projecting lower SLR 
would be optimistic.  
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optimism did not project especially low magnitudes of SLR (Figure 3). As Expert 8 
remarked, ‘one man’s pessimism is another man’s optimism’ and such outlooks are 
subjective. Having said this, it is reasonable to suggest that if these participants were not 
being optimistic their SLR judgements may have been different. Such optimism has 
been documented in expert judgements before (e.g. Tichy 2004) and dispositional 
elements like these should be acknowledged as potential factors influencing risk 
communication and decision making. 
Concluding discussion 
We used expert probability judgement to elicit a suite of local projections for 
future SLR on the Severn Estuary in the southwest of the UK. We found strong 
consensus for a high likelihood of future SLR there. However, there is wide variation 
between judgements and much uncertainty regarding the magnitude of future rise. 
Importantly, while median estimates correspond to IPCC projections, top-end 
uncertainties are far greater.  
Unlike frequentist probabilities, such as tossing a coin, or predictions that are 
easily tested after the event such as weather forecasts (Murphy and Winkler 1974), SLR 
projections for 2050, 2100 and 2200 cannot be calibrated. While it is clearly not feasible 
to design adaptation strategies that are robust to any point on the experts’ distributions, 
it is important to consider the plural nature of these projections - for one of the outliers 
among the respondents may be correct. Robust adaptation planning for SLR must 
therefore be flexible (Hulme, Pielke, and Dessai 2009), for instance employing ‘low-
regrets’ measures such as early warning systems, risk communications and sustainable 
land management, that provide benefits under a range of future scenarios (IPCC 2012).  
We explored the feasibility of eliciting subjective probabilities for long 
timescales (2200) as well as for time horizons that most climate experts are familiar 
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with (2050 and 2100). This was a methodological question relevant to both SLR and 
climate change projection more generally. Participants found long-timescale projections 
challenging, and questioned the utility of such an exercise. Though this finding is 
unsurprising (see Lonsdale et al. 2008), it is important because difficulties in thinking 
about the future may have implications for the ways in which long timescale SLR 
projections are made, communicated and utilised. It poses the question of whether key 
reports should more routinely include explicit long timescale projections, such as those 
provided by the most recent IPCC reports (IPCC 2013a), so that they are more readily 
available to experts. But it also poses the question of how useful such projections can 
be. More research is therefore needed to investigate the best ways in which to elicit long 
timescale projections. If it is not possible to do this in a way that is acceptable to expert 
participants while also providing useful projections, long-term SLR responses will have 
to focus on reactive or shorter term anticipatory management.  
We thematically analysed interview transcripts to explore expert reasoning. 
These analyses indicated that experts’ judgements may have been influenced by their 
choice of methods and information sources, heuristics, and the ways in which they 
thought about the future. These findings reiterate the merits of integrating qualitative 
and quantitative methods in uncertainty judgements, as recommended by Stirling 
(2010). They also imply that such qualitative factors should be acknowledged. Indeed, 
‘for post-normal science, the decision making process is as important as the research 
product’ (Dessai and Hulme 2004, 120). 
There are a number of limitations to this study. First, each expert’s judgement 
depends on what they retrieve from memory (or their chosen source) at a particular 
time, and possibly on the order in which the information is integrated into a unified 
opinion (Wallsten and Budescu 1983). Each judgement is therefore a snap-shot of 
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opinion at the time the interview was carried out and may change in light of further 
deliberation or new information. The second limitation is linked to the first, and relates 
to our decision to allow participants to consult literature during elicitations. Such an 
approach encouraged an open discussion of anchoring and herding heuristics and 
highlighted the most popular sources of information; but it may in turn have encouraged 
anchoring and herding, thus leading to biased responses.  
It should be reiterated that the experts participating in this research had varying 
levels and types of expertise in relation to SLR processes and rates. Although no 
participant refused to participate in the probability elicitation, some were not entirely 
comfortable with the procedure, and felt that they were not well qualified for such an 
exercise. One expert felt that the process was like ‘almost being asked to deny what 
other people have done and what other people think’. This reluctance to participate in 
expert elicitations should be recognised, and has been previously noted by Arnell, 
Tompkins, and Adger (2005).  
Our final limitation relates to the number of experts that we sampled. While 
structured elicitations can be carried out with smaller numbers of experts (Cooke and 
Goossens 2004 suggest a minimum of four), a greater number of experts would have 
allowed a more thorough exploration of how different roles and experiences may 
influence judgements, and could facilitate statistical comparisons between groups. This 
would be a productive avenue for further research.  
At this juncture, we can conclude that personal differences such as heuristics and 
future thinking were evident during elicitations of future SLR at the local scale, and 
may have influenced projections. Such personal differences cannot be eliminated from 
judgements, and nor should they be (e.g. Slovic et al. 2004, Tichy 2004). Instead, risk 
assessors must make explicit the reasoning behind judgements and the basis on which 
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they are made (Oppenheimer et al. 2007), minimise biases (Vosgerau 2010), and 
acknowledge subjectivity (Donovan, Oppenheimer, and Bravo 2012) to ensure that 
judgements are transparent. Provided this is done, subjective probability elicitations 
should remain a valuable tool for considering SLR at local scales.  
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Table 1: Expertise, genders and years of experience of interviewees 
Expert Expertise Gender Experience 
in field 
(years) 
1 Academic  Male 5-10 
2 Government  Female <5 
3 Academic  Male >20 
4 Academic  Female  5-10 
5 Consultant  Female  11-20 
6 Academic  Male 11-20 
7 County Council  Male >20 
8 Environment Agency  Male 5-10 
9 Government  Female  <5 
10 Academic & advisor to various organisations including local 
authorities and government organisations 
Male >20 
11 Academic Male >20 
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Table 2: Selected global and local projections of sea-level rise 
 Projection Description  
Global projections  
IPCC’s Fifth Assessment 
Report (AR5)(IPCC 
2013b) 
26cm to 98cm by 
2100 
Model-based likely range for four Representative 
Concentration Pathway scenarios, compared to 
1986-2005 
IPCC’s Fourth 
Assessment Report 
(AR4)(IPCC 2007a) 
18cm to 59cm by 
2100 
Model-based range for six emissions scenarios, 
compared to 1980-1999 
Titus and Narayanan 
(1996) 
34cm by 2100 
and 81cm by 
2200 
Aggregated median estimates of SLR from 
expert elicitations  
Local projections 
MCCIP (2010) 21–68cm  by 
2095 
SLR projected under a medium greenhouse gas 
emission scenario by 2095 for Cardiff, Severn 
Estuary  
UKCP09 (see UK Climate 
Projections 2012) 
44.4 cm by 2095 Medium emissions scenario for Cardiff, Severn 
Estuary  
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Table 3: Sources and methods used by experts to estimate future sea-level rise on the 
Severn Estuary 
 
Expert  Sources Methods 
1  Shennan and Horton 
(2002) 
Recorded rates used to project future rise.  
2 UKCP09 UKCP09 emissions scenario graphs taken ‘as rough guidelines and 
taking my own approximation from there’, and bearing in mind that 
the sources only include certain emissions scenarios. 
2200: thought about processes such as feedbacks, ice caps melting, 
and high emissions scenarios. 
3 UKCP09 and academic 
papers about local SLR 
2050: UKCP09 and continuation on a trajectory, ‘just allowing what 
we know has happened to carry on happening’ 
2200 minima: UK coastal geology.  
4 IPCC (from memory) Based on measured rates in the literature, plus a mental probability 
density function (PDF). Rates not worked out accurately, but used as 
a guide.  
5  UKCP09 and the 
Severn Estuary Second 
Shoreline Management 
Plan (SMP2) 
‘A general feel’.  
2200: extrapolated from 2100, and compared what the world was 
like 200 years ago with what it could possibly be like in 200 years. 
6  His own work, other 
data sets and IPCC 
estimates 
Used geological record and his own sea level measurements to 
extrapolate rates into the future. Also used other data sets with 
longer time scales, and created a mental curve with an accelerated 
rise.  
7  Shoreline Management 
Plans, UKCP09 
‘Semi-informed’ gut feelings based on background knowledge. Once 
plotted, looked at the graph and spread it out to make it less steep.   
8  UKCP09, Defra (UK 
Department for 
Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs) and 
various others 
Used historical rates, published projection graphs (including Defra 
and UKCP09), background reading and ‘general knowledge about 
what is happening from a climatic point of view’. 
9  Severn Estuary Second 
Shoreline Management 
Plan (SMP2) 
Extrapolated from the 2100 1m estimate used in the SMP2. 
10  Variety of published 
sources, especially 
UKCP09 
Used rates from published sources, extrapolating from a range of 
emissions scenarios; as well as thinking about extreme scenarios, 
time lags, and physical processes. 
11  IPCC, literature, 
observations (including 
satellite).  
Used rates and trends. Drew families of curves, using instincts for 
2200, increasing the ranges due to greater uncertainties associated 
with making projections specific to the Severn Estuary. 
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Table 4: Sources of uncertainty cited by experts in their judgements of future SLR on 
the Severn Estuary 
 
Expert Sources of aleatory uncertainties 
1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10, 
11  
Uncertainties in future conditions e.g. emissions scenarios, impacts of a potential 
Severn Barrage on local sea level. 
7 Unknowables 
 Sources of epistemic uncertainties 
2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 11  Process uncertainty, e.g. ice sheet response to warming, feedbacks, time lags, regime 
shifts 
2, 3, 8, 10  Climate model uncertainty  
7, 9 Availability of and confidence in data  
2, 5 Unavailability / non-existence of projections for long timescales 
8 Uncertainties about what parameters are included in published guidance projections  
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Figure 1: The location of the Severn Estuary (a) within the UK (inset, b) 
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Figure 2: Example of points on an elicited subjective probability distribution. The points 
[X] are elicited from the expert, before a rough line (A) is drawn between the points. 
Sea levels corresponding to confidence intervals (B) are then checked with the expert. 
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Figure 3: Box plots summarising expert subjective probability distributions. Box plots 
show results elicited for relative sea-level change on the Severn Estuary in 2050, 2100 
and 2200. Vertical tick marks indicate 90% confidence intervals, and boxes denote 50% 
confidence intervals. Open circles indicate medians, solid triangles indicate ‘best 
estimates’ (value chosen if the expert were to bet money on it) and the open triangle 
indicates a reluctantly stated best estimate (Expert 10 was reluctant to give best 
estimates because he felt it defeats the object of a probability distribution). Question 
marks show where no absolute maximum or minimum was stated, and dashed lines 
show where no explicit probability or very low probabilities (1/105 to 1/109) were 
estimated. PLE = possible low emissions scenario; BAU = business as usual scenario; 
IM = intermediate mitigation scenario; SM = stringent mitigation scenario.  
 
 
